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This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different
sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model
designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare
different sharing rules like, for example, grandfathering (i.e.  sharing proportional to
emissions) and a number of so-called equitable rules like, for example, sharing
proportional to population or according to historical responsibilities. Due to strong free-
rider incentives we find only small stable coalitions for all sharing rules examined. As a
general pattern we observe that coalitions consist of regions with low marginal
abatement costs, which are attractive partners in any coalition, and regions which have
the highest claims according to the respective sharing rule. Furthermore, we find that a
grandfathering scheme leads to the largest and – in terms of greenhouse gas abatement –
most successful coalition, while many of the equitable rules achieve very little.
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The distribution of emission rights ranks high on the international agenda to reach agreements
to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to mitigate climate change. Emission rights in the
form of tradable permits are seen as a cost-effective instrument to achieve emission reduction
targets for GHGs. However, the introduction of new property rights raises distributional
concerns. Grandfathering schemes that allocate tradable permits proportional to emissions in a
base year have been criticised for giving advantage to the largest polluters. In the course of the
discussion a number of alternative suggestions have been brought forward, summarised by
Rose (1992), Barrett (1992), Kverndokk (1995) and Rose et al. (1998). Following Rose et al.
(1998) it is useful to distinguish three different types of rules for equitable sharing: allocation
based rules which apply to the initial distribution of emission permits, outcome based rules
which apply to the distribution of the net benefits from emission reductions, and process based
rules which comprise criteria for fair decision-making.
This paper deals with outcome based sharing rules. But both, our focus and our approach, are
different from previous studies of outcome based rules because we do not stipulate the
existence of a binding international agreement. Rather we examine the possibility of self-
enforcing agreements. In the absence of an enforcing supra-national body an international
environmental agreement will have to be self-enforcing (Barrett 1994). In this paper we study
the impact of different rules to share the gains from cooperation on the stability of
international climate agreements.
International environmental agreements have be described as games of coalition formation
and have been studied by Hoel (1992), Barrett (1994), Na and Shin (1998) and others; see
Bloch (2003) for a general survey of coalition formation games and Finus (2003) for a survey
focusing on international environmental agreements. It is our prime interest in this paper to
examine the stability of international climate coalitions under different surplus sharing rules.
This problem has not yet received any attention. The work that comes closest to this paper is
by Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2004) who consider the impact of permit distribution on
coalition stability, i.e. they consider allocation based rules. Bosello et al. (2003) have
examined the impact of "outcome based equity criteria" on coalition stability, however, their
equity concept is severely biased; they consider only equality on the abatement cost side and
they disregard of the distribution of benefits from abatement completely.
To analyse stability of international climate agreements we employ a cartel formation game
with open membership introduced by d'Aspremont et al. (1983). The game is a two-stage
game. At stage one players decide whether or not to participate in an international agreement.3
Those who decide to participate form a coalition.
1 We refer to those who do not participate as
singletons. At stage two the coalition behaves like a single player; each singleton region and
the coalition set emission reduction levels as an optimal response to others' emissions. For a
singleton it is optimal to reduce emissions such that marginal abatement costs equal marginal
benefits from a reduction of damages. Since emission reduction is a global public good, it is
optimal for a coalition to reduce emissions such that the sum of the marginal benefits of all
coalition members equal the marginal abatement costs. Payoffs are calculated from costs and
benefits of abatement assuming the coalition employs a given sharing rule. The (subgame
perfect) equilibria of the game coincide with the set of stable coalitions; see Finus et al.
(2003). A coalition is stable if no member has an incentive to leave the coalition (internal
stability) and no singleton player has an incentive to join (external stability).
In our specification of the game (see section 4 for details) any coalition of two or more regions
will always generate a surplus for its members as compared to the case where all regions are
singletons; but it will also generate positive spillovers to non-members. Although there is a
surplus, there will still be incentives to free-ride. An important factor determining the free-
rider incentives is the distribution of the surplus between coalition members, i.e. the sharing
rule applied. We determine stable international climate coalitions for eight different sharing
rules using a regionalised global model (12 regions) in which marginal costs of and marginal
benefits from a reduction of GHGs are specified for each region. The model, called STACO,
is designed to analyse the stability of coalitions. It has been introduced by Finus et al. (2003)
and it has been used in subsequent work by Finus et al. (2004) and Altamirano-Cabrera et al.
(2004).
We find that, in general, coalitions consist of regions with low marginal abatement costs,
which are attractive partners in any coalition, and regions which receive the largest share of
the coalition surplus under a given sharing rule. While we do not claim that the empirical
specification of the STACO model reflects the current knowledge on the impacts of climate
change in all details, it reflects the main inter-regional differences of GHG abatement costs
and damage costs of climate change. Therefore, our results may be instructive for the future
design of climate policies.
The next section introduces a formal model of coalition formation. Stability of international
climate coalitions depends on how the gains from cooperation are shared. We assume that
sharing is based on claims and a rule how surplus shares are derived from claims. Section 3
discusses the selection of a surplus sharing rule. We go one step beyond the consideration of
the  ad hoc rules presented by Rose et al. (1998) and provide a rationale for the use of
                                                
1 There is only a single coalition ("the cartel") and every player is free to join; this explains the name "cartel
formation game with open membership".4
proportional sharing. However, an ad hoc element remains regarding what constitutes a claim.
Section 4 introduces the empirical specification of the model introduced in section 2. Section
5 presents the results of the stability checks for a sample of reasonable claims. Section 6
concludes.
2  Coalition formation and coalition stability
We apply the cartel formation game introduced by d'Aspremont et al. (1983) to the case of
GHG abatement. The game proposed is a two-stage game where a coalition forms at the first
stage; at the second stage abatement decisions are taken. To explain the structure of the game
and its most important characteristics we first consider a simple transboundary pollution game
without coalition formation (Mäler 1989, Folmer and von Mouche 2000). Then, we introduce
coalition formation.
Consider a simple transboundary pollution game. Let  {1,2,..., } Nn =  be a set of players
(regions). Suppose each player i has an initial level of uncontrolled emissions  i e  and each
player adopts a pollution control strategy (abatement level)  [0, ] ii qe ∈ . In the case of GHGs
abatement qi is a pure public good. Each player receives benefits bi from total abatement
i iN qq
∈ = ∑  and incurs costs ci for own abatement qi. We assume  d /d 0 i bq > , 
22 d/ d 0 i bq ≤ ,
d/ d 0 ii cq >  and 
2 2 d/ d 0 ii cq > . Individual payoffs are
() ( ) ii i i bq cq π= − .
Further specifications of benefits and costs are provided in section 4. In the equilibrium each
player adopts an abatement level qi which is an optimal response to others' emissions. It holds
for each player that marginal benefits equal marginal abatement costs. Under a set of standard
assumptions about production and damage cost functions and under a regularity assumption
2
such transboundary pollution game has a unique interior Nash equilibrium if pollution is
uniformly distributed (Folmer and von Mouche 2000, Proposition 3). As this condition applies
to GHGs we will have a unique Nash equilibrium in a simple (no coalitions) GHG emissions
game. Denote the Nash equilibrium abatement of player i 
*
i q , then the Nash equilibrium
payoffs are
** * () () ii i i bq cq π= − .
This serves as a benchmark for the following.
                                                
2 The regularity assumption guarantees an interior solution. It requires that both, some small amount of
emissions and some small amount of abatement, will be beneficial.5
We now consider coalition (cartel) formation. At the first stage each player chooses a strategy
i σ  from a strategy set  {0,1} i ≡ σ ; 0 i σ=  means that i is not joining the coalition;  1 i σ=  means
that i is joining the coalition. Denote KN ⊆  the set of k coalition members;  Kk ≡ . As there
is only a single coalition, if any, we will also refer to K as a coalition structure. If  1 k ≤  the
singletons coalition structure emerges. Given a non-trivial coalition K with  2 k ≥ , the
coalition maximises the joint payoff of the coalition members at the second stage. The game
played at stage two is the simple transboundary pollution game described above where the
coalition K and nk −  singletons are the players; i.e. there are  1 nk −+  players. Hence, (i) the
coalition adopts an abatement strategy which is an optimal response to others' emissions; and
(ii) each singleton player adopts an abatement level which is an optimal response to others'
emissions. Denote i's abatement level under coalition structure K by 
K
i q . The payoffs are as
follows.
For singleton players we obtain the payoffs:
() ()
KK K
ii i i bq cq π= −    for all  \ iN K ∈ .
For coalition members a sharing rule applies. A sharing rule assigns a share si of the coalition
surplus S
K to every coalition member iK ∈ . The coalition surplus S
K is defined as the joint
gain of the coalition members compared with their payoff in the benchmark situation of a






Sb q c q
∈∈
=− − π ∑∑ .
The payoff of a coalition member is given by her benchmark payoff plus her share of the
coalition surplus.
* KK
ii i sS π= π +⋅    for all iK ∈ .
An important special case to consider is the case of the grand coalition, KN = . The grand
coalition will internalise all externalities of GHG emissions and adopt a Pareto efficient
abatement strategy. The resulting abatement strategy profile  1 ( ,..., )
NN
n qq  is unique (see Folmer
and von Mouche 2000, Theorem 1).
3 Sharing rules
Regions which join an international agreement will do so to secure a benefit from cooperation.
Whether there is a benefit for an individual region and how large this benefit will be is a
matter of the sharing rule used to distribute the overall benefit within the coalition. Note that,6
although there is a benefit from cooperation, a coalition might not be stable because the
benefit from free-riding is even larger. Hence, a given coalition faces a surplus sharing
problem and the rule according to which the surplus is shared is important for the decision of
a region whether or not to join.
Formally a surplus sharing problem is a triple  ,, KS λ  where KN ⊆  is a set of k coalition
members;  1 ( ,..., )
k
k + λ= λ λ ∈ R  is vector of individual claims of the coalition members; S + ∈ R
is the surplus to be shared. Claims are based on characteristics that are considered relevant for
the sharing problem. This will be discussed below. Let Ω  be the set of all surplus sharing
problems. A solution to a surplus sharing problem, called sharing rule, is a mapping
:
k
+ Ω→ R R , i.e. a rule R assigns a payoff vector  1 ( ,..., ) k ss s =  to every surplus sharing




= = ∑ . Hence, a sharing rule is always efficient in the sense that
it distributes the entire surplus.
3
Following Moulin (1987) and, particularly, Pfingsten (1991) we require that a sharing rule
satisfies the following properties:
Anonymity: For all  , ij K ∈ , all 
k
+ λ∈ R , and all S + ∈ R ,
ij i j ss λ= λ⇒ = .
Surplus monotonicity: For all iK ∈ , all 
k
+ λ∈ R , and all  , SS + ′ ∈ R ,
(,,) (,,) ii SS s K S s K S ′′ >⇒ λ ≥ λ .
Additivity: For all iK ∈ , all 
k
+ λ∈ R  and all  , SS + ′ ∈ R ,
(,, ) (,,) (,,) ii i sK S S sK S sK S ′′ λ+ = λ + λ .
Separability: For all iK ∈ , all HK ⊂  and H ≠∅ , all  ,
k
+ ′ λλ∈ R , and all  , SS + ′ ∈ R ,
ií ′ λ= λ  for all iH ∈  and  ( , , ) ( , , ) ii iH iH sK S sK S
∈∈ ′′ λ= λ ∑∑  ⇒  (,,) (,,) ii sK S sK S ′′ λ= λ '.
Anonymity requires equal treatment of equals. Surplus monotonicity says that no one should
loose if the surplus increases. Additivity says that payoffs should not change if the surplus is
paid out in two instalments instead of one. Separability is a subgroup consistency requirement
which says that individual payoffs in every subgroup depend only on the claims of the players
in the subgroup and the subgroup's surplus. Anonymity and Surplus monotonicity are hardly
debatable. We would argue that Additivity applies to the case at hand. As the true damages of
climate change and, hence, the true benefits of abatement become known at a later stage, the
distribution should not depend upon the pattern of how benefits become available. The case
for Separability is that it should not matter for the final outcome whether a player receives her
                                                
3 This is a formal definition of a sharing rule when claims are given; in other sections of the paper we use the
term "sharing rule" in a broader sense reflecting also claims.7
share of the coalition surplus directly or whether payment is received by a subcoalition who
then distributes the joint share of the surplus to its members.
Pfingsten (1990) has shown that these properties characterise a family of sharing rules:
4
PROPOSITION 1 (Pfingsten): A sharing rule R satisfies Anonymity, Surplus monotonicity,
Additivity and Separability if and only if R is either
(i) equal sharing: 
1
(,,) i sK S S
k
λ= ,










or (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii) 
1








λ= α + − α
λ ∑
,
where 01 <α< .
As Anonymity, Surplus monotonicity, Additivity and Separability are defendable properties for
the case of coalitions for GHG abatement, proposition 1 characterises the set of reasonable
sharing rules.
In what follows we consider a set of 8 sharing problems which differ with respect to what
constitutes a claim. One can apply different rules to these sharing problems (equal sharing,
proportional sharing and combinations), our focus is, however, on proportional sharing.
Egalitarian claims: ij λ= λ , for all i, j.
All players (regions) have equal claims. Egalitarian claims seem not to be convincing in the
case of climate coalitions of heterogeneous regions. But still we include this case as a
benchmark case because proportional sharing under egalitarian claims coincides with equal
sharing.
Regional income claims: ii GDP λ= ,
where GDPi is region i's gross national product in a base year. This rule has also been dubbed
"horizontal equity" by Rose et al. (1998). One appealing feature of the rule is that it maintains
relative welfare positions.
Population claims: ii pop λ= ,
                                                
4 In the proof Pfingsten (1991) also uses a property called No advantageous reallocation which requires that the
coalition surplus is independent of the distribution of claims. This always holds in the GHG abatement game
analysed in this paper.8
where popi is region i's population in a base year. The motivation for this rule is
straightforward: If individuals have equal rights to the global commons, gains from
cooperation should be distributed evenly across the global population.
Ability-to-pay claims: () / ii i GDP pop
− γ
λ= ,  0 γ > .
Regions with a lower per capita income have a larger claim. Under this rule climate policy is
used a means to reduce inequality. So the motivation stems from outside climate policy. The
distribution may be guided by some principle of "international justice".
Emissions claims:        ii e λ= ,
where e i are region i's emissions in a base year. Emissions claims can be interpreted as
historical rights.
Inverse emissions claims: ii e
− γ λ=  with  0 γ > .
Regions with a higher emissions share receive a lower share of the gains from cooperation.
These claims reflect historical responsibilities.
Damage cost claims: ii d λ= ,
where d i is the net present value of region i's damages from climate change. After
implementation of abatement policies, some damages due to climate change will still remain.
Those who suffer larger damages, should receive a larger compensation.
Abatement cost claims: ii c λ= ,
where c i is the net present value of region i's abatement cost. The coalition surplus can be
interpreted as a return to abatement investments. Who bears larger costs should be entitled to
a larger share of the surplus.
Of course, a longer list of possible claims could be generated. Next to egalitarian claims
which serve as a benchmark we include income, population and ability-to-pay claims because
they have received extensive discussion by Rose et al. (1998). Emissions claims are probably
the most prominent and are the outcome based analogue to a grandfathering scheme of
emission permits. Inverse emission claims, which reflect historical responsibilities, are less
prominent in economic analysis, but they have received some discussion in philosophy
(Gosseries 2004, Weikard 2004). We have included damage cost and abatement cost claims
because they reflect different views on compensation. Marginal damage cost claims seem
worth considering as they have been discussed in the literature (cf. Chander and Tulkens
1995). However, our empirical results are derived using a linear damage cost function. In this
case, the use of marginal damage cost claims will lead to the same result as the use of damage
cost claims. Marginal abatement cost claims have not been included because the optimal
abatement strategy for the coalition requires equal marginal abatement cost for all coalition
members; hence, such claims will lead to equal sharing.9
4 Empirical model and data
In order to examine the sharing problems described in the previous section we adopt a 12-
regions model, called STACO, introduced by Finus et al. (2003). STACO considers a baseline
scenario of growing emissions over a 100 years time horizon. A discount rate of 2% is used
for intertemporal aggregation to calculate the net present values of costs and benefits of
abatement.
STACO uses a specification of regional abatement cost functions from Ellerman and Decaux
(1998). Marginal abatement costs are specified as  ()
2
i i ii ii aq q q ′ =+ ξζ, where  ,0 ii > ξζ  are
regional parameters. The model regions are the following: United States (USA), Japan (JPN),
European Union (EEC), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European countries (EET),
former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND),
dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA), and all remaining other countries (ROW).
STACO considers constant abatement paths; abatement costs are assumed to be constant over
time. Table 1 gives discounted marginal abatement costs for a uniform abatement level across
regions (column 2). Furthermore, Table 1 reports emissions reductions for the Nash
equilibrium of the singletons coalition structure (column 3), and the corresponding marginal
and total abatement costs (columns 4 and 5). Emissions reductions and marginal and total
abatement costs are also reported for the grand coalition (columns 6-8). It can be seen from
column 2 that, for a uniform abatement level, CHN has the lowest marginal abatement costs
followed by USA and FSU while BRA has by far the highest. CHN, USA and FSU have high
emissions levels (see Table 2, column 5) and cheap abatement options, while BRA's
abatement options are expensive due to low emissions levels. For the singletons coalition
structure the picture changes. EET and BRA have the lowest marginal abatement cost while
EEC and USA have the highest. In this case each region equates marginal abatement costs
with marginal damage costs which causes USA and EEC to adopt high levels of abatement
while BRA chooses to abate very little. Under a grand coalition 37 % of the global abatement
will take place in CHN since CHN provides the cheapest abatement options. One can presume
that CHN is an attractive partner in any stable climate coalition that might emerge.
The STACO model uses a linear approximation of the damage cost function of the DICE
model introduced by Nordhaus (1997). Moreover, the damage cost function is rescaled using
estimates of Tol (1997). Global benefits from abatement are defined as avoided damages.
Regional benefits are calculated as shares of global benefits from abatement based on
estimates from Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997); see Finus et al. (2003). The shares are
reported in Table 2, column 7. Because STACO uses a linear benefits function marginal
benefits are constant and are reported in Table 1, column 4 (recall that for each region
marginal benefits equal marginal abatement costs for the singletons coalition structure).10
Table 1:  Benchmark cases: singletons coalition structure and grand coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)























($/ton) (Mton/year) ($/ton) (bln $) (Mton/year) ($/ton) (bln $)
USA 1.40 162.3 8.46 53.33 379 37.4 513
JPN 55.84 7.7 6.45 2.44 36 37.4 63
EEC 5.82 66.2 8.83 24.22 161 37.4 229
OOE 8.94 19.0 1.29 0.82 102 37.4 127
EET 9.56 9.3 0.49 0.18 102 37.4 130
FSU 2.57 49.6 2.52 4.24 193 37.4 242
EEX 9.98 7.9 1.12 0.43 124 37.4 188
CHN 0.59 154.9 2.32 16.09 956 37.4 1,348
IND 3.31 33.6 1.87 2.73 216 37.4 295
DAE 13.20 5.4 0.93 0.24 102 37.4 155
BRA 787.81 0.2 0.57 0.00 7 37.4 12
ROW 4.00 37.2 2.54 3.95 185 37.4 250
World 553.2 108.68 2,563 37.4 3,553
Source: Finus et al. (2003), own calculations.
As explained in section 2 any coalition chooses a level of abatement where marginal
abatement costs (for each of the coalition members) equals the sum of the marginal benefits
from abatement. Under the STACO specification benefits are linear in abatement. In a
transboundary pollution game the following holds:
PROPOSITION 2 (Folmer and von Mouche): Under linear damage costs (constant marginal
damage costs) players have a dominant abatement strategy.
No coalition or singleton will adjust its strategy if others change theirs, because there is no
change in marginal damage cost. Proposition 2 states an important feature of the STACO
specification. That regions have a dominant strategy in the global pollution game implies that
there is no "leakage". Members of a non-trivial coalition will abate more compared with the
singletons coalition structure. This additional abatement is not offset by less abatement of the
remaining singletons, as they have dominant strategies. Note that this feature does not
generally apply in a broader class of transboundary pollution games.
The information on benefits and costs of abatement described above is sufficient to determine
the payoffs for every singleton or coalition in the global pollution game. To determine the
payoffs and equilibria of the coalition formation game we need information on the sharing of
coalition surplus. Surplus is shared proportional to claims. Table 2 presents the input data for
the claims specified in section 3. The table does not report egalitarian claims which are the
same for all. Also the table does not report abatement cost claims which are coalition
sensitive.
Coalition membership is most attractive for a region if it has a high claim and receives a large
share of the surplus. So we expect to find EEC and USA in a coalition if surplus sharing is11
according to income or damages. EEX and CHN receive the largest shares under population
claims, CHN and IND under ability-to-pay claims, USA and CHN under emissions claims,
and BRA and DAE under inverse emission claims.
Table 2:  Overview of claims

























USA 8845 305 431 2.42 0.41 22.6
JPN 5584 124 386 0.56 1.80 17.3
EEC 9579 375 445 1.40 0.71 23.6
OOE 1902 142 523 0.62 1.61 3.5
EET 405 120 736 0.51 1.93 1.3
FSU 501 287 863 1.00 1.00 6.7
EEX 1650 1602 1000 1.22 0.82 3.0
CHN 1021 1340 1057 2.36 0.42 6.2
IND 458 1145 1257 0.63 1.56 5.0
DAE 972 207 679 0.41 2.47 2.5
BRA 774 190 703 0.13 7.81 1.5
ROW 1119 584 852 0.70 1.43 6.8
WORLD 32810 6421 - 11.96 - 100.0
Notes: (a) Data refer to the level of GDP in 2010 in 1985 US$. Global figure for 2010 level taken from
DICE model and regional shares from table 1.1 of World Bank (2002). (b) Data for individual countries
was aggregated into our 12 regions following Babiker et al. (2001). (c) Data refer to the level of
population in 2010. Extrapolated figures from 2000 levels using information from table 2.1 of World
Bank (2002). (d) From columns 2 and 3 for γ  = 0.25. (e) Own calculations from STACO. (f) From
column 5 for γ  = 1. (g) STACO calibration, Finus et al. (2003).
5  Results and discussion
The STACO model is used to generate the payoffs for every possible coalition structure (2
12–
12 = 4084 in a 12 regions model) for the sharing schemes described above. STACO performs
a stability check and identifies the internally stable coalitions (where no member would want
to leave) and the externally stable coalitions (where no singleton would want to join). The
findings for the 8 sharing schemes and the benchmark cases (singletons coalition structure and
the grand coalition) are summarised in Table 3.
5 The stable coalitions for each scheme are
listed in column 2. Column 3 reports the global annual emission reduction and columns 4-6
report costs, benefits and the resulting net benefits from abatement. Note that a considerable
amount of benefits is obtained under the singletons coalition structure. The additional net
benefits due to coalition formation are reported in column 7 as the sum of coalition surplus
and external benefits; in column 8 this is expressed as a percentage.
There are several findings. It can be seen from Table 3, column 7, that for all sharing rules
considered the remaining singletons receive large shares of the benefits generated by the
                                                
5 For a more detailed discussion of the benchmark cases see Finus et al. (2003).12
coalition. This indicates that there are strong incentives to free-ride. Accordingly, the stable
coalitions we find are small and comprise of only two regions for most sharing schemes, but
larger stable coalitions of three or four regions exist for some sharing schemes. However,
transfer schemes enhance stability. We find stable coalitions for all rules considered. For
comparison, Finus et al. (2003) look at results from the STACO model without considering
transfers; they do not find any stable coalition in this case.
Table 3: Overview of results
































(Singletons)* 553 109 2,069 1,960 0+0 0.0




2563 3,553 9,584 6,031 4071+0 100.0
Egalitarian EET, CHN, IND 711 159 2,658 2,499 22+516 13.2
Regional income EEC, CHN 870 311 3,253 2,942 151+831 24.1
Population EEX, CHN 620 127 2,317 2,190 4+226 5.7
Ability-to-pay EET, FSU, CHN 731 172 2,735 2,563 32+571 14.8
EET, EEX, CHN 665 140 2,485 2,346 12+374 9.5
EET, CHN, IND 711 159 2,658 2,499 22+516 13.2
Emissions USA, EET, EEX,
CHN
1030 436 3,854 3,418 264+1194 35.8
Inverse emissions EET, BRA 559 109 2,090 1,981 0.2+21 0.5
CHN, BRA 582 116 2,176 2,059 1+98 2.4
Damage cost USA, CHN 874 314 3,270 2,956 142+854 24.5
EEC, CHN 870 311 3,253 2,942 151+831 24.1
Abatement cost USA, CHN 874 314 3,270 2,956 142+854 24.5
JPN, CHN 796 237 2,976 2,739 85+694 19.1
OOE, CHN 626 129 2,341 2,212 6+246 6.2
FSU, CHN 683 154 2,553 2,398 17+421 10.8
EEX, CHN 620 127 2,317 2,190 4+226 5.7
CHN, IND 662 143 2,477 2,334 11+363 9.2
CHN, ROW 683 155 2,555 2,400 17+423 10.8
* The benchmark cases are not stable coalition structures.
The design of the transfer schemes is important. Our result is strikingly different from the
findings of Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2004) who consider sharing of emission permits and
not, as in this paper, sharing of net benefits from coalition formation. Altamirano-Cabrera et
al. (2004) find a total of 4 stable coalitions for grandfathering schemes of emission permits;
they do not find any stability for any of the "equitable rules" they consider. To understand the
difference notice that the following holds:
PROPOSITION  3: In a climate coalition (cartel) formation game with linear abatement
benefits and with surplus sharing all two-player coalitions are internally stable.
Proof: In such game abatement is a global public good. Consider coalitions K' and K with
KK ′ ⊂  and K′ ≠∅ . It holds that 
KK qq
′ >  as the larger coalition will abate more and the
singletons maintain their dominant strategy (Proposition 2). Hence, it also holds that the13
coalition surplus is increasing in coalition size, 
KK SS
′ > . Suppose now  1 K′ = . Then, for any






π> π ∑∑. Hence, there always exists a positive
surplus to be shared and for all 
* :( ) ( { } )
i ii iK K K i ∈π > π−= π .
We observe that the use of egalitarian claims, population claims, ability-to-pay claims and
inverse emission claims is not very successful in terms of emission reduction and in terms of
net benefits as compared to the singletons case. Abatement cost claims give a mixed picture.
Sharing according to regional income and damages is more successful. The best results are
obtained when claims are according to emissions. The stable coalition found for that case
comprises of USA, EET, EEX and CHN and achieves about 35% of the gains that the grand
coalition would achieve.
Another observation is that CHN always joins the coalition except for the "extreme" case of
inverse emissions. The explanation here is straightforward. Due to low marginal abatement
cost CHN is an attractive partner in a coalition. But it depends on the sharing rule who will
sign an agreement with CHN. For example, with an equal sharing rule USA or EEC are not
involved. On equal sharing CHN would receive a too large share of the surplus and it is better
for USA or EEC to take a free-rider position. A similar situation arises with sharing according
to population or ability-to-pay. The situation is different with income claims and damages
claims. In these cases USA or EEC can reap more of the benefits, sufficiently much to make
the free-rider position unattractive.
In the "extreme case" of inverse emissions there are coalitions with BRA. The intuitive
explanation is as follows. With inverse emission claims BRA has by far the largest claim. This
makes it attractive for BRA to join any existing coalition which makes them externally
unstable. Coalitions with BRA, however, are unattractive for other coalition partners, which
makes them internally unstable, unless the coalition is of size 2 (see Proposition 3). Also note
that BRA has little options for CO2 emission abatement and, hence, high abatement costs.
Coalitions with BRA achieve very little as compared to the singletons benchmark case.
More generally, the following pattern emerges. As CHN has by far the lowest abatement
costs, it has an incentive to join (almost) any two-player coalition. CHN's low cost abatement
options generate a high coalition surplus of which it receives a sufficient share under almost
every reasonable rule. Therefore, (almost) every two-player coalition not involving CHN will
be externally unstable. Hence, if a two-player coalition is stable it is likely to involve CHN.
From proposition 3 we know that every two-player coalition is internally stable. However, it
is, in general, attractive for others to join a coalition including CHN, in particular for regions
with large claims. Thus, where we find stable two-player coalitions they will consist of CHN
and the region with the largest claim. This pattern applies in a straightforward manner to
income claims ({EEC, CHN}), population claims ({EEX, CHN}), inverse emission claims
({CHN, BRA}), and damage cost claims ({USA, CHN} and {EEC, CHN}). This simple14
pattern does not apply to abatement cost claims as abatement costs are coalition dependent. In
this case, seven (out of eleven) two-player coalitions with CHN are stable.
In the remaining cases of equal sharing, ability-to-pay claims and emissions claims we find
coalitions of size three or more. The subsequent analysis seeks to identify the factors which
are relevant for the composition of stable coalitions. Can we identify regions that are more
likely to join a coalition than others? In general, in our setting, regions are described by three
parameters: marginal abatement cost, marginal benefits, and the claims to a coalition surplus.
For the decision whether or not to join a coalition a region compares its share of the surplus
when joining a coalition with its free-rider surplus. First, consider the impact of marginal
abatement costs. Regions which have low marginal abatement costs contribute more to the
size of the coalition surplus. Hence, with other things equal, we would expect to find the
regions with the lowest marginal abatement costs in a coalition. Second, the impact of
marginal benefits is ambiguous. On the one hand, high marginal benefits stimulate coalition
partners to abate more which contributes to a higher coalition surplus. On the other hand high
marginal benefits are an incentive to free-ride. One can define a free-rider surplus as the
product of marginal benefits from abatement and the additional abatement of the coalition
(compared to the singletons coalition structure).
6 We presume that high marginal benefits
cause stronger incentives to free-ride than incentives to join the coalition. This is because the
additional surplus of joining will have to be shared with other coalition members. Other things
being equal a region is more likely to be in coalition if its marginal benefits are low. Third,
with unequal claims, a region is more likely to join a coalition if its claims are high.
We use this argument to construct a rough indicator for the relative advantage from coalition
membership. We use the following ingredients: (i) marginal abatement cost at 50 Mton per
year (Table 1, column 3), c′ , (ii) marginal benefits (Table 1, column 5), b′ , and (iii) the share
of total claims (Table 2). Rescaling the cost and benefits parameters, we propose the following
coalition membership index I:
2
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The first factor captures surplus size; the second captures free-rider incentives; the third
captures 'the size of a region's share in a coalition. A region is more likely to be a coalition
member if it has a high coalition membership index, that is if its marginal abatement costs are
low, if its marginal benefits are low, and if its share of the surplus is high. Of course, such
indicator cannot work "precisely" as marginal abatement cost and the share of the surplus a
                                                
6 Marginal benefits are assumed to be constant and are given in Table 1 column 5; in the singletons coalition
structure marginal benefits equal marginal abatement costs.15
region receives will be coalition dependent. A general coalition membership index cannot be
constructed as this requires to attach weights to each component of the index which will differ
between claim types. However, based on parameters  í c′ ,  i b′  and  í λ  we can obtain a partial
ordering of coalition membership: If region i is a coalition member, then region j with  jí cc ′′ < ,
jí bb ′′ <  and  jí λ> λ  will also be a coalition member. If region i is not a coalition member, then
region j with  jí cc ′′ > ,  jí bb ′′ >  and  jí λ< λ  cannot be a coalition member either.
The index we suggest is reported in Table 4. For equal sharing the highest coalition
membership indices are reported for CHN, EET and IND. These regions form the only
externally stable coalition of the about 100 internally stable coalitions for the case of equal
sharing. This confirms our expectation. In the case of income claims EEC has a higher index
than CHN. In this case the index identifies only USA correctly as a coalition member. For the
cases of population claims, ability-to-pay claims, inverse emission claims and damage cost
claims the index performs well, identifying correctly members of stable coalitions. For
emission claims three of the four coalition members are correctly identified.
Table 4: Coalition membership index*









USA 0.22 0.73 0.13 0.13 0.54 0.05 0.61
JPN 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.11
EEC 0.10 0.35 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.29
OOE 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.10
EET 0.47 0.07 0.11 0.46 0.24 0.49 0.07
FSU 0.28 0.05 0.15 0.32 0.28 0.15 0.22
EEX 0.25 0.15 0.73 0.33 0.30 0.11 0.09
CHN 0.79 0.30 1.99 1.13 1.88 0.18 0.59
IND 0.29 0.05 0.61 0.48 0.18 0.25 0.17
DAE 0.25 0.09 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.34 0.08
BRA 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.63 0.03
ROW 0.22 0.09 0.24 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.18
* Members of stable coalitions are indicated with bold figures. Italics indicate the two cases where coalition
membership is not correctly described by the index.
The most successful coalition we find is when claims are according to emissions. As can be
seen from Table 5 the success of the coalition for the global surplus depends largely on the
presence of both, USA and CHN, in the coalition. Three players coalitions {EET, EEX, CHN}
and {USA, EET, EEX} are less successful than {USA, CHN}, which achieves a global
surplus of 996 bln US$ over 100 years (not reported in the table). In the case of emissions
claims CHN has strong incentives to join as it has high claims (and obtains a large share of the
surplus when joining) and it has low abatement costs. In fact, no coalition that does not
include CHN is externally stable. USA joins CHN because under emission claims USA
receives the largest share. EEC has the third largest claim, but they have a strong free-rider
incentive. USA and CHN are joined by EET and EEX who receive lower shares than EEC but16
have less incentive to free-ride. The simple intuitive explanation why emission based claims
are more successful than any alternative rule considered here is as follows. A high level of
emissions is linked to better opportunities for abatement and, hence, low abatement costs.
Coalitions that include regions with lower abatement costs create a larger surplus. Under
emissions claims these regions are encouraged to join a coalition.












share of coalition surplus (bold) or free-rider surplus
(bln US$ over 100 years)
USA 94  83 85 26 96
JPN 72 265 248 66 308
EEC 98 362 339 90 421
OOE 14  53 50 13 62
EET 2  20 19 6 22
FSU 28 104 97 26 120
EEX 4 4 5 43 14 52
CHN 7  81 83 24 94
IND 21  77 72 19 89
DAE 10  38 36 10 44
BRA 6  23 22 6 27
ROW 28 104 98 26 121
World 386 1,256 1,191 326 1,458
* This coalition is internally and externally stable.
6  Conclusion
Greenhouse gas abatement is a global public good. It is hardly surprising that the
implementation of the Kyoto protocol is hampered by adverse incentives of potential coalition
partners although a large coalition could create large scale global benefits. Due to the public
goods character of abatement the very success of a coalition undermines its viability. The
more abatement a coalition achieves the stronger grow the incentives to free-ride. This paper
explores the role of surplus sharing for coalition stability. We have identified the stable
coalitions for a set of different modes of surplus sharing; in particular we examine equal
sharing and sharing proportional to claims. The results show that some of the sharing
schemes, for example when claims reflect historical responsibilities (inverse emissions),
generate only small and ineffective coalitions ({EET, BRA} and {CHN, BRA}). These
achieve only 0.5% and 2.4% of the potential surplus of globally optimal carbon abatement,
respectively. In the given set of rules proportional sharing with emission claims performs best.
The coalition {USA, EET, EEX, CHN} achieves about 35% of the potential surplus.
Emissions claims set the right incentives to get the large emitters with low abatement costs
"into the boat". As a general pattern one can observe coalitions where CHN is joined by the
region with the largest claim. CHN provides low-cost abatement options and is, thus, an17
attractive coalition partner for regions with a large claim. Hence, CHN is joined by EEC under
income claims, by EEX under population claims, by IND (and others) under ability-to-pay
claims, by USA (and others) under emission claims, by BRA with inverse emission claims,
and by USA under damage cost and abatement cost claims.
This paper studies the performance of a set of given sharing rules that have been proposed in
the debate on climate change policies. The task for subsequent research is to use these insights
for the design of sharing rules which will stabilise larger and more successful coalitions. For
the success of a coalition it is important to get the regions with low abatement costs to join.
But these will do little unless regions with high marginal damage costs are also joining. Only
this would lead to a large scale internalisation of the externalities from carbon emissions.
Finally, our results indicate that concerns for equity, taking ability to pay or historical
responsibilities into account, may well be counterproductive as surplus sharing under such
rules leads to small and ineffective coalitions.
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